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Abstract — publish–subscribe is a messaging pattern where
senders of messages, called publishers, do not program the
messages to be sent directly to specific receivers, called
subscribers. provisioning of basic security mechanisms such as
authentication and confidentiality is highly challenging in a
content based publish/subscribe system. Authentication of
publishers and subscribers is difficult to achieve due to the
loose coupling of publishers and subscribers. Likewise,
confidentiality of events and subscriptions conflicts with
content-based routing. This paper presents a novel approach to
provide confidentiality and authentication in a broker-less
content-based publish/subscribe system. The authentication of
publishers and subscribers as well as confidentiality of events
is ensured, by adapting the pairing-based cryptography
mechanisms, to the needs of a publish/subscribe system.
Furthermore, an algorithm to cluster subscribers according to
their subscriptions preserves a weak notion of subscription
confidentiality. In addition to our previous work [20], this
paper contributes 1) use of searchable encryption to enable
efficient routing of encrypted events, 2) multicredential routing
a new event dissemination strategy to strengthen the weak
subscription confidentiality, and 3) thorough analysis of
different attacks on subscription confidentiality. The overall
approach provides fine-grained key management and the cost
for encryption, decryption, and routing is in the order of
subscribed attributes. Moreover, the evaluations show that
providing security is affordable w.r.t. 1) throughput of the
proposed cryptographic primitives, and 2) delays incurred
during the construction of the publish/subscribe overlay and
the event dissemination.
Keywords —Content-based,publish/subscribe,peer-to-peer,
broker-less, security, identity-based encryption
I. Introduction
Published messages are characterized into classes,
without knowledge of what, if any, subscribers there may
be. Similarly, subscribers express interest in one or more
classes, and only receive messages that are of interest,
without knowledge of what, if any, publishers there
are.Pub/sub is a sibling of the message queue paradigm,
and is typically one part of a larger message-oriented
middleware system. Most messaging systems support
both the pub/sub and message queue models in their API,
e.g. Java Message Service (JMS).This pattern provides
greater network scalability and a more dynamic network
topology, with a resulting decreased flexibility to modify
the Publisher and its structure of the data published.
publishers inject information into the pub/sub system, and
subscribers specify the events of interest by means of
subscriptions. Published events are routed to their relevant
subscribers, without the publishers knowing the relevant
set of subscribers, or vice versa. This decoupling is
traditionally ensured by intermediate routing over a
broker network [10]. In more recent systems, publishers
and subscribers organize themselves in a broker-less
routing infrastructure, forming an event forwarding
overlay [14]. Content-based pub/sub is the variant that
provides the most expressive subscription model, where
subscriptions define restrictions on the message content.
Its expressiveness and asynchronous nature is particularly
useful for large-scale distributed applications such as
news distribution, stock exchange, environmental
monitoring, traffic control, and public sensing. Not
surprisingly, pub/sub needs to provide supportive
mechanisms to fulfill the basic security demands of these
applications such as access control and confidentiality.
Access control in the context of pub/sub system means
that only authenticated publishers are allowed to
disseminate events in the network and only those events
are delivered to authorized subscribers. Moreover, the
content of events should not be exposed to the routing
infrastructure and a subscriber should receive all relevant
events without revealing its subscription to the system.
Solving these security issues in a content-based pub/sub
system imposes new challenges. For instance, end-to-end
authentication using a public key infrastructure (PKI)
conflicts with the loose coupling between publishers and
subscribers, a key requirement for building scalable
pub/sub systems. For PKI, publishers must maintain the
public keys of all interested subscribers to encrypt events.
Subscribers must know the public keys of all relevant
publishers to verify the authenticity of the received
events. Furthermore, traditional mechanisms to provide
confidentiality by encrypting the whole event message
conflict with the content-based routing paradigm. Hence,
new mechanisms are needed to route encrypted events to
subscribers without knowing their subscriptions and to
allow subscribers and publishers authenticate each other
without knowing each other. In the past, most research
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has focused only on providing expressive and scalable
pub/sub systems, but little attention has been paid for the
need of security. Existing approaches toward secure
pub/sub systems mostly rely on the presence of a
traditional broker network [20], [2], [9], [12], [7], [18],
[16]. These either address security under restricted
expressiveness, for example, by using only keyword
matching for routing events [12], [20] or rely on a
network of (semi-)trusted brokers [19], [17], [12].
Furthermore, existing approaches use coarse-grain epoch
based key management and cannot provide fine-grain
access control in a scalable manner [12], [20].
Nevertheless, security in broker-less pub/sub systems,
where the subscribers are clustered according to their
subscriptions, has not been discussed yet in the literature.
Building on our results of [13], this paper presents a new
approach to provide authentication and confidentiality in
a broker-less pub/sub system. Our approach allow
subscribers to maintain credentials according to their
subscriptions. Private keys assigned to the subscribers are
labeled with the credentials. A publisher associates each
encrypted event with a set of credentials. We adapted
identity-based encryption (IBE) mechanisms [4], [8] 1) to
ensure that a particular subscriber can decrypt an event
only if there is a match between the credentials associated
with the event and the key; and 2) to allow subscribers to
verify the authenticity of received events. Furthermore,
we address the issue of subscription confidentiality in the
presence of semantic clustering of subscribers. A weaker
notion of subscription confidentiality is defined and a
secure overlay maintenance protocol is designed to
preserve the weak subscription confidentiality. In addition
to [3], we also present 1) extensions of the cryptographic
methods to provide efficient routing of encrypted events
by using the idea of searchable encryption, 2)
“Multicredential routing” a new event dissemination
strategy which strengthens the weak subscription
confidentiality, and 3) a thorough analysis of different
attacks on subscription confidentiality.
II .PROBLEM STATEMENT
The provisioning of basic security mechanisms such as
authentication and confidentiality is highly challenging in
a contentbased publish/subscribe system. Authentication
of publishers and subscribers is difficult to achieve due to
the loose coupling of publishers and subscribers.
Likewise, confidentiality of events and subscriptions
conflicts with content-based routing. This paper presents a
novel approach to provide confidentiality and
authentication in a broker-less content-based
publish/subscribe system. The authentication of
publishers and subscribers as well as confidentiality of
events is ensured, by adapting the pairing-based
cryptography mechanisms, to the needs of a
publish/subscribe system. Furthermore, an algorithm to
cluster subscribers according to their subscriptions
preserves a weak notion of subscription confidentiality.
III .RELATED WORK
Content-Based Publish/Subscribe:
For the routing of events from publishers to the relevant
subscribers, we use the content-based data model. The
event space, denoted by , is composed of a global ordered
set of d distinct attributes (Ai): f(A1, A2, ... Ad). Each
attribute Ai is characterized by a unique name, its data
type, and its domain. The data type can be any ordered
type such as integer, floating point, and character strings.
The domain describes the range of possible attribute
values. The operator O typically includes equality and
range operations for numeric attributes and prefix/suffix
operations for strings. An event consists of attributes and
associated values. An event is matched against a
subscription f if the values of attributes in the event
satisfy the corresponding constraints imposed by the
subscription. We consider pub/sub in a setting where
there exits no dedicated broker infrastructure. Publishers
and subscribers contribute as peers to the maintenance of
a self-organizing overlay structure. To authenticate
publishers, we use the concept of advertisements in which
a publisher announces beforehand the set of events.
Attacker Model
Our attacker model is similar to the commonly used
honestbut-curious model [12], [11]. There are two entities
in the system: publishers and subscribers. Both the
entities are computationally bounded and do not trust each
other. Moreover, all the peers (publishers or subscribers)
participating in the pub/sub overlay network are honest
and do not deviate from the designed protocol. Likewise,
authorized publishers only disseminate valid events in the
system. However, malicious publishers may masquerade
the authorized publishers and spam the overlay network
with fake and duplicate events. We do not intend to solve
the digital copyright problem; therefore, authorized
subscribers do not reveal the content of successfully
decrypted events to other subscribers. Subscribers are,
however, curious to discover the subscriptions of other
subscribers and published events to which they are not
authorized to subscribe. Similarly, curious publishers may
be interested to read events published in the system.
Furthermore, passive attackers outside the pub/sub
overlay network can eavesdrop the communication and
try to discover content of events and subscriptions.
Finally, we assume the presence of secure channels for
the distribution of keys from the key server to the
publishers and subscribers. A secure channel can be easily
realized by using transport layer mechanisms such as
Transport Layer Security (TLS) or Secure Socket Layer
(SSL).
International Journal of Science Engineering and Advance Technology,
IJSEAT,Vol.3,Issue 8
ISSN 2321-6905
August 2015
www.ijseat.com Page 320
There are three major goals for the proposed secure pub/
sub system, namely to support authentication,
confidentiality, and scalability. Authentication. To avoid
noneligible publications, only authorized publishers
should be able to publish events in the system. Similarly,
subscribers should only receive those messages to which
they are authorized to subscribe. Confidentiality. In a
broker-less environment, two aspects of confidentiality
are of interest: 1) the events are only visible to authorized
subscribers and are protected from illegal modifications,
and 2) the subscriptions of subscribers are confidential
and unforgeable. Scalability. The secure pub/sub system
should scale with the number of subscribers in the system.
Three aspects are important to preserve scalability: 1) the
number of keys to be managed and the cost of
subscription should be independent of the number of
subscribers in the system, 2) the key server and
subscribers should maintain small and constant numbers
of keys per subscription, and 3) the overhead because of
rekeying should be minimized without compromising the
fine-grained access control.
Identity-Based Encryption
While a traditional PKI infrastructure requires to maintain
for each publisher or subscriber a private/public key pair
which has to be known between communicating entities
to encrypt and decrypt messages, identity-based
encryption [6] provides a promising alternative to reduce
the amount of keys to be managed. In identity-based
encryption, any valid string which uniquely identifies a
user can be the public key of the user. A key server
maintains a single pair of public
and private master keys. The master public key can be
used by the sender to encrypt and send the messages to a
user with any identity, for example, an e-mail address. To
successfully decrypt the message, a receiver needs to
obtain a private key for its identity from the key server.
Fig. 1 shows the basic idea of using identity-based
encryption. We want to stress here that although identity-
based encryption at the first glance appears like a highly
centralized solution, its properties are ideal for highly
distributed applications. A sender needs to know only a
single master public key to communicate with any
identity. Similarly, a receiver only obtains private keys for
its own identities. Furthermore, an instance of central key
server can be easily replicated within the network.
Finally, a key server maintains only a single pair of
master keys and, therefore, can be realized as a smart
card, provided to each participant of the system. Although
identity-based encryption has been proposed some time
ago, only recently pairing-based cryptography (PBC) has
laid the foundation of practical implementation of
identity-based encryption. Pairing-based cryptography
establishes a mapping between two cryptographic groups
by means of bilinear maps. This allows the reduction of
one problem in one group to a different usually easier
problem in another group. We utilize bilinear maps for
establishing the basic security mechanisms in the pub/sub
system and, therefore, introduce here the main properties.
In our approach, publishers and subscribers interact with a
key server. They provide credentials to the key server and
in turn receive keys which fit the expressed capabilities in
the credentials. Subsequently, those keys can be used to
encrypt, decrypt, and sign relevant messages in the
contentbased pub/sub system, i.e., the credential becomes
authorized by the key server. A credential consists of two
parts: 1) a binary string which describes the capability of
a peer in publishing and receiving events, and 2) a proof
of its identity. The latter is used for authentication against
the key server and verification whether the capabilities
match the identity of the peer. While this can happen in a
variety of ways, for example, relying on challenge
response, hardware support, and so on, we pay attention
mainly at expressing the capabilities of a credential, i.e.,
how subscribers and publishers can create a credential.
This process needs to account for the many possibilities to
partition the set of events expressed by an advertisement
or subscription and exploits overlaps in subscriptions and
publications. Subsequently, we use the term credential
only for referring to the capability string of a credential.
The keys assigned to publishers and subscribers, and the
ciphertexts, are labeled with credentials. In particular, the
identity-based encryption ensures that a particular key can
decrypt a particular ciphertext only if there is a match
between the credentials of the ciphertext and the key.
Publishers and subscribers maintain separate private keys
for each authorized credential. The public keys are
generated by a string concatenation of a credential, an
epoch for key revocation, a symbol distinguishing
publishers from subscribers, and some additional
parameters. The public keys can be easily generated by
any peer without contacting the key server or other peers
in the system. Similarly, encryption of events and their
verification using public keys do not require any
interaction. Due to the loose coupling between publishers
and subscribers, a publisher does not know the set of
relevant subscribers in the system. Therefore, a published
event is encrypted with the public key of all possible
credentials, which authorizes a subscriber to successfully
decrypt the event. The ciphertexts of the encrypted event
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are then signed with the private key of the publisher, as
shown in Fig. 2. The overlay network is maintained
according to the containment relationship between the
subscriptions. Subscribers with coarser subscriptions are
placed near the root and forward events to the subscribers
with less coarser subscriptions. To maintain such a
topology, each subscriber should know the subscription of
its parent and child peers. When a new subscriber arrives,
it sends the connection request (CR) along with its
subscription to a random peer in the overlay network. The
connection request is forwarded by possibly many peers
in the overlay network before it reaches the right peer to
connect. Each forwarding peer matches the subscription
in the request with the subscription of its parent and child
peers to decide the forwarding direction. Maintaining a
relationship between subscriptions clearly contradicts
subscription confidentiality. Therefore, we show the
approach to ensure a weaker notion of subscription
confidentiality.
Numeric Attributes
The event space, composed of d distinct numeric
attributes, can be geometrically modeled as a d-
dimensional space such that each attribute represents a
dimension in the space. With the spatial indexing
approach, the event space is hierarchically decomposed
into regular subspaces, which serve as enclosing
approximation for the subscriptions, advertisements, and
events. The decomposition procedure divides the domain
of one dimension after the other and recursively starts
over in the created subspaces. Fig. 3 visualizes the
advancing decomposition with the aid of a binary tree.
Subspaces are identified by a bit string of “0” and “1”s. A
subspace represented by dz1 is covered by the subspace
represented by dz2, if dz2 is a prefix of dz1. Subscription
or advertisement of a peer can be composed of several
subspaces. A credential is assigned for each of the
mapped subspace. For instance, in Fig. 3, f2 is mapped to
two subspaces and therefore possesses two credentials
f000; 010g. An event can be approximated by the smallest
(finest granularity) subspace that encloses the point
represented by it. To deliver the encrypted event, a
ciphertext must be generated for each subspace that
encloses the event so that the peer whose subscription
mapped to any of these subspaces should be able to
successfully decrypt the event. For example, an event
0010 is enclosed by the five subspaces 0010, 001, 00, 0,
and . For an event space with a large set of numeric
attributes, the number of mapped subspaces and,
therefore, credentials for a subscription can be very large.
This affects the scalability of the system. We address this
problem by decomposing the domain of each attribute
into subspaces separately. The spatial indexing procedure
is the same as above; however, in this case, a separate
decomposition tree is built for each attribute. Each peer
receives credentials separately for each attribute in its
subscription. The number of credentials maintained for
each subscription or advertisement is bounded.
IV. Conclusion
The approach is highly scalable in terms of number of
subscribers and publishers in the system and the number
of keys maintained by them. In particular, we have
developed mechanisms to assign credentials to publishers
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and subscribers according to their subscriptions and
advertisements.In this paper, we have presented a new
approach to provide authentication and confidentiality in
a broker-less contentbased pub/sub system. Private keys
assigned to publishers and subscribers, and the ciphertexts
are labeled with credentials. We adapted techniques from
identitybased encryption 1) to ensure that a particular
subscriber can decrypt an event only if there is a match
between the credentials associated with the event and its
private keys and 2) to allow subscribers to verify the
authenticity of received events. Furthermore, we
developed a secure overlay maintenance protocol and
proposed two event dissemination strategies to preserve
the weak subscription confidentiality in the presence of
semantic clustering of subscribers. The evaluations
demonstrate the viability of the proposed security
mechanisms and analyze attacks on subscription
confidentiality.
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